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This paper offers a possible explanation for the conflicting results in the literature concerning the 
empirical relation between collateral and loan risk.  We posit that certain economic characteristics of 
collateral may be associated with the empirical dominance of different risk-collateral channels implied by 
economic theory, namely the “lender selection,” “borrower selection,” “risk-shifting,” and “loss 
mitigation” channels.  Each of these four channels has different predictions regarding the empirical 
relations between collateral and loan risk.  For our sample of commercial loans, we find that the “lender 
selection” channel appears to be especially important for outside collateral, the “risk-shifting” and “loss 
mitigation” channels are important for liquid collateral, and the “borrower selection” channel appears to 
hold weakly for nondivertible collateral.  Our results suggest that the conflicting results in the extant risk-
collateral literature may occur because different samples may be dominated by collateral with different 
economic characteristics. 
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Reexamining the Empirical Relation between Loan Risk and Collateral:  




Collateral is a prominent feature of debt contracts.  In the wake of the recent financial crisis, it has become 
increasingly clear that significant declines in the value of widely pledged assets can amplify the business cycle 
through procyclical changes in credit availability (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, 1990; Kiyatoki and Moore, 
1997; Gan, 2007).  For example, as U.S. housing prices began falling in the latter half of the 2000s, mortgage 
defaults rose substantially and the value of mortgage-related collateral plummeted.  As a result, households’ ability 
to borrow against their homes and financial institutions’ ability to pledge or sell mortgage-backed securities became 
impaired and a global financial crisis ensued. 
While these events suggest that secured credit may be associated with higher risk, economic 
theory allows for collateral pledges to be associated with either higher or lower risk.  Economic theory 
generally explains collateral as an attempt to reduce agency costs or contracting frictions in the presence 
of asymmetric information.  One strand of theory motivates collateral as part of an optimal debt contract 
by invoking ex post frictions, like moral hazard, and predicts that observably riskier borrowers are more 
likely to be required to pledge collateral.1  A second set of theories focuses on ex ante private information 
and suggests that collateral may allow lenders to sort observationally equivalent loan applicants through 
signaling.2  Specifically, lenders offer a menu of contract terms such that observationally equivalent 
applicants with higher-quality projects choose secured debt with lower risk premiums, while those with 
lower-quality projects self-select into unsecured debt with higher risk premiums.   
                                                 
1 See Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991), Boot and Thakor (1994), Aghion and Bolton (1997), and Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1997) for examples of models with moral hazard.  Other ex post frictions identified in the literature include 
difficulties in enforcing contracts (e.g., Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, 2004; Cooley, 
Marimon, and Quadrini, 2004) and costly state verification (e.g., Townsend, 1979; Gale and Hellwig, 1985; 
Williamson, 1986; Boyd and Smith, 1994).   
 
2 For examples of these theoretical models, see Bester (1985, 1987), Besanko and Thakor (1987a, 1987b), Chan and 




To test these theories, a number of studies link measures of loan risk – such as loan risk 
premiums (loan rates minus the risk-free rate) and ex post nonperformance (delinquency or default) – to 
whether or not collateral was pledged.  The findings are mixed.  Some studies report a positive relation 
between loan risk premiums and collateral (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1990; Blackwell and Winters, 1997; 
Machauer and Weber, 1998; John, Lynch, and Puri, 2003; Brick and Palia, 2007; Godlewski and Weill 
2011), while others find a negative relation (e.g., Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000; Lehmann and 
Neuberger, 2001; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010; Berger, Frame, and Ioannidou, 2011).3  One study finds 
no significant relation between collateral and loan risk premiums for loans drawn under commitment 
(Berger and Udell, 1995).  In addition, two studies find that ex post nonperformance of loans is positively 
related to collateral (Jimenez and Saurina, 2004; Berger, Frame, and Ioannidou, 2011).   
To our knowledge, there are no attempts to explain this puzzle in the literature – why the 
empirical relation between loan risk and collateral is sometimes positive and other times negative.  This 
paper provides a potential solution by examining the empirical relation between loan risk and the 
economic characteristics of collateral, each of which may be associated with the empirical dominance of 
different risk-collateral channels implied by economic theory (outlined below).  This suggests that the 
prior literature may have conflicting results because the different samples may be dominated by collateral 
with different economic characteristics. 
Ex post theories of collateral imply the existence of three individual channels with different 
predictions for the empirical relation between loan risk and collateral.  The first is the “lender selection” 
channel under which observably riskier borrowers are more often required by lenders to pledge collateral 
to reduce ex post frictions.  The second is the “risk shifting” channel, which encourages borrowers to shift 
into safer investment projects when collateral is pledged.  The third is the “loss mitigation” channel in 
which collateral reduces losses in the event of borrower default, as the lender is able to recover value 
                                                 
3 Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) report a negative relation between commercial loan rates and the incidence of 
collateral.  The result is presumably consistent with a negative relation between loan rate premiums and collateral, 




from the pledged assets.  Hence, depending on how successful collateral is in resolving the ex post 
frictions for which it is pledged, the empirical relation between collateral and loan risk may positive or 
negative.  By contrast, ex ante private information theories of collateral predict an unambiguous negative 
relation between loan risk and collateral.  This is due to the “borrower selection” channel in which 
unobservably safer borrowers tend to pledge collateral more often to signal their underlying quality.  This 
prediction is further reinforced by the aforementioned “risk shifting” and “loss mitigation” channels, 
which may also be in effect under the ex ante theories.  In our empirical analysis below, we attempt to 
isolate the four risk-collateral channels to the extent possible. 
The degree to which information-based contracting frictions are mitigated by collateral should depend on 
the economic characteristics of the collateral.  All else equal, we hypothesize that all four of the channels of 
collateral on loan risk should be stronger when the observable economic characteristics of collateral are more 
desirable.  For example, the “borrower selection” channel should be stronger when the collateral is more desirable 
because the unobservably safest borrowers are expected to choose the lowest loan rates and pledge the most desired 
type of collateral.  As well, the “lender selection” channel should be stronger when the collateral is more desirable as 
the lender is likely to insist on such collateral from the riskiest borrowers.  The “risk shifting” and “loss mitigation” 
channels are similarly stronger when collateral is more desirable.  We argue that liquidity, nondivertibility, and 
outside ownership status (discussed further below) are desirable collateral characteristics.  
Some prior research analyzes individual economic characteristics of collateral and collateral types, 
although none look at a variety of collateral characteristics and types concurrently.4  Berger and Udell (1995) find 
that neither accounts receivable and inventory nor other types of collateral have significant effects on loan rate 
premiums for a sample of U.S. small businesses.  John, Lynch, and Puri (2003) study U.S. corporate debt and find 
that non-mortgage collateral pledges are associated with higher interest rates than mortgage collateral pledges and 
unsecured loans – a result that is stronger for longer-term loans and loans to riskier firms.  Voordeckers and 
Steijvers (2006) examine small commercial loans from a large Belgian bank and find that the pledging of outside 
collateral (assets not otherwise legally attachable in the event of default) is more likely for informationally opaque 
                                                 
4 However, one paper does relate the incidence of some individual collateral types to a measure of the expected 




firms (i.e., loans made to younger and family firms and small loans).  Brick and Palia (2007) find that higher interest 
rates are charged for small business loans backed by outside collateral relative to inside collateral.  Benmelech, 
Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2005) find that the terms of commercial real estate loans are affected by the zoning 
regulations associated with the underlying properties, which the authors use as a measure of redeployability. (We 
consider “redeployability” as being synonymous with “liquidity.”)  The study finds that more redeployable (liquid) 
assets receive larger loans with longer maturities and lower interest rates.   
Three other papers empirically demonstrate that airline financing conditions are related to the 
redeployability (liquidity) of the firm’s fleet.  First, Benmelech and Bergman (2008) find that airlines are better able 
to renegotiate their airplane leases when the liquidation value of their fleet is low.  Second, Benmelech and Bergman 
(2009) find that the pricing of collateralized debt obligations financing airplanes depends on the aircraft model as 
bonds backed by more redeployable (liquid) airplanes carry lower interest rates.  Finally, Benmelech and Bergman 
(2011) show that airline bankruptcies produce a negative externality for other firms in the industry by increasing the 
available supply of airplanes.  The authors identify this “collateral channel” using prices for collateralized debt 
obligations – finding that the effect is stronger for less redeployable (liquid) models, less senior tranches, and higher 
loan-to-value ratios. 
This paper significantly extends the empirical literature by studying the relations between loan risk and 
collateral characteristics using detailed commercial loan data provided by a national credit registry.  Specifically, we 
relate two different measures of loan risk that have been employed in the literature (loan risk premiums and ex post 
loan nonperformance) to a simple indicator of collateral being pledged, as well as three key economic characteristics 
of collateral derived from nine different collateral types.  The first collateral characteristic is “liquidity,” or the ease, 
cost, and time with which the secured assets can be converted to cash at fair market value in the event of default.  
Bank deposits and securities are examples of liquid collateral.  The second collateral characteristic studied is 
“divertibility,” or the ability of the firm to divert an asset (e.g., equipment) to alternative uses or reduce its 
maintenance, which can result in lower recovery values.  The third collateral characteristic is an indication of 
ownership status i.e., whether the pledged asset would otherwise be legally attachable in the event of default.  As 
discussed by Chan and Kanatas (1985), the economic theories of collateral described above generally assume that 
the asset being pledged comes from outside of the firm.  This “outside collateral,” such as an owner’s home in the 
case of limited liability firms, acts like additional equity in the firm.     
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By way of preview, we find that overall the incidence of collateral is associated with lower loan 
risk premiums and a higher probability of ex post loan nonperformance (delinquency or default).  For 
reasons explained below, these findings suggest that an important reason why collateral is pledged is 
because banks require collateral from observably riskier borrowers (the “lender selection” channel), while 
the main reason for the lower risk premiums is because secured loans yield lower losses in the event of 
default (the “loss mitigation” channel).  However, the risk-collateral channels appear to depend on the 
characteristics of collateral.  The “lender selection” channel appears to be especially important for outside 
collateral, the “risk-shifting” and “loss mitigation” channels are important for liquid collateral, and the 
“borrower selection” channel appears to hold weakly for nondivertible collateral.  These results are robust 
to an additional instrumental variable analysis that attempts to control for the potential endogeneity of 
collateral using information from past loans.  Because our mapping from the reported collateral types to 
the economic characteristics is somewhat subjective, we also provide supplementary results for the 
empirical relation between loan risk and each of the individual collateral types.  Overall, our results 
suggest roles for all four risk-collateral channels implied by economic theory and document that the 
relative importance of these four channels varies significantly with the economic characteristics of 
collateral.  This suggests a possible solution to the puzzle in the empirical literature.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II describes the credit registry data 
we use.  Section III outlines our empirical tests and Section IV presents our main results.  Section V 
provides some additional evidence, while Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Data 
The data used in this paper come from the Central de Información de Riesgos Crediticios (CIRC), 
the public credit registry of Bolivia, provided by the Bolivian Superintendent of Banks and Financial 
Entities (SBEF). Since CIRC’s creation in 1989, the SBEF requires all formal (licensed and regulated) 
financial institutions operating in Bolivia to report detailed information on all loans.  Our sample covers 
the entire credit registry for the period between January 1998 and December 2003.  For each loan, we 
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have information on origination and maturity dates, credit type, interest rate, collateral type, and ex post 
nonperformance through the sample period (delinquencies and defaults).  For each borrower, we have 
information about their industry, physical location, legal structure, banking relationships, and whether 
they have been delinquent or defaulted on another loan in the recent past.   
The data include loans from both commercial banks and nonbank financial institutions (e.g., 
private financial funds, credit unions, mutual societies, and general deposit warehouses).  To keep the set 
of lenders homogenous in terms of financial structure and regulation, we focus exclusively on loans 
granted by the 13 commercial banks operating in Bolivia between March 1999 and December 2003.5  Our 
sample of firms draws mostly from the larger and less risky firms in Bolivia, as smaller and riskier firms 
can only access microcredit institutions.  Nevertheless, even for our sample of relatively larger firms, 
there is very little reliable information other than what is available through the credit registry.  The vast 
majority of Bolivian firms does not have audited financial statements.  Capital markets are not well 
developed and the banking sector is the principal source of debt finance for most of these firms (Sirtaine, 
Skamelos, and Frank 2004).  Thus, our sample of firms has many of the typical characteristics of small 
and medium size businesses that borrow from commercial banks throughout the world.   
For our analysis, we focus only on commercial loans.  Commercial loans represent an important 
segment of the credit markets for which collateral is a negotiated loan term that is only sometimes present 
and where a wide variety of assets is pledged.  There are several types of commercial credit contracts in 
the data, including credit cards, overdrafts, installment loans, discount loans, and lines of credit.  We 
focus exclusively on installment loans and discount loans, which together account for 92 percent of the 
total value of commercial loans during the sample period.  Ninety-eight percent of the installment and 
discount loans are denominated in U.S. dollars and we only use these loans in our analysis.  To ensure the 
                                                 
 
5 Although we have data as of January 1998, we start our sample in March 1999 since prior to this date the data do 
not allow us to distinguish been commercial and consumer loans.  However, we use the prior information from 
January 1998 through February 1999 to help fill in the history of bank-firm relationships as well as the firm’s credit 




use of timely information, we only use new loans and exclude renegotiations6 and loans drawn on pre-
existing lines of credit.7  Given our focus on the economic characteristics of collateral and their 
underlying types, we exclude loans with multiple types of collateral.  The resulting sample encompasses 
28,252 loans (to 2,462 different firms) of which 18 percent are secured.   
The types of security interests that Bolivian banks can invoke when accepting collateral are 
determined by the law.8  Acceptable security interests on real property include mortgages (hypothecas), 
pledges (prenda), and collateral bonds (bonos de prenda).  Mortgages are used for immovable property 
(e.g., real estate) and some types of movable property (e.g., vehicles, aircrafts, and boats).  Pledges and 
collateral bonds, on the other hand, are security interests on other kinds of movable property (e.g., 
equipment, inventory, and accounts receivable).  There are two classes of pledges: with and without 
transfer of possession.  Pledges with transfer of possession (often referred to as “common pledges”) 
require the transfer of movable property to the creditor or an authorized warehouse.  Pledges without 
transfer of possession, on the other hand, are often used when the property is essential for the firm’s 
operations.9  A collateral bond (also known as a warrant) is a security issued by an authorized warehouse 
indicating possession of an asset and its value.  By endorsing the collateral bond to a lender, the firm 
pledges the deposited assets to obtain secured credit.  Hence, collateral bonds are similar to pledges with 
transfer of possession.  In addition to security interest on real property, Bolivian banks can also use 
                                                 
6 Banks are required to indicate whether a loan is a renegotiation of a previous (performing or nonperforming) loan 
and we use this information to exclude renegotiations.  To the extent that some renegotiations are not recorded 
(either because of reporting errors or because banks do that intentionally to reduce their loan loss reserves), our 
sample will include some loans renegotiations as new loans.  Hence, in the sensitivity analysis below we try to 
control for this possibility by dropping all “suspected renegotiations” from our sample. 
 
7 Loans drawn on pre-existing lines of credit are identified as follows.  When a borrower draws on a pre-existing line 
of credit, a “new loan” appears in the registry with an origination date and contact terms as of the date the bank 
originated the credit line.  Since the date the loan first appears in the registry is subsequent to the origination date, 
we can identify when a “new loan” is a draw on a pre-existing line of credit and then exclude it from our sample. 
 
8Ley de Bancos y Entidades Financieras, Law No. 1488 of April 14, 1993. 
 
9 When there are concerns about agency problems, a warehouse can be set up at the firm’s premises to control access 




security interest on financial assets such as bank guarantees (garantías bancarias), deposits in financial 
institutions (garantías de depositos), and financial securities (garantías en títulos valores).   
All types of security interests used by Bolivian banks must be registered with the pertinent 
authorities, along with the encumbered assets.  This is a time consuming and expensive process that often 
renders the use of collateral as impractical or prohibitively expensive, which may explain why the 
incidence of collateral in Bolivia is low relative to other countries.10  Registration allows for a more 
efficient enforcement in the event of default with the use of “Processo Coactivo Civil.” 11  The “Processo 
Coactivo Civil” is a faster enforcement procedure that escapes automatic stay and allows lenders to 
invoke their security interests once the borrower has materially bridged its contractual obligations.12   
Table 1 provides variable names, definitions, and summary statistics for all loans in the sample.13  
At the time of loan origination, only 0.3 percent of the loans are given to firms that have defaulted in the 
prior 12 months (Prior_Default).  Hence, it seems that firms that default rarely get another loan— either 
because they are credit rationed or because they cease to exist as a going concern.  About 21.1 percent of 
the loans are given to firms that had a delinquency with any bank in the previous 12 months (Prior_NPL).  
Most of the sample firms are limited liability corporations (48.8 percent), while joint stock corporations 
(22.2 percent), limited partnerships (13.6 percent), sole proprietorships (12.6 percent), and general 
partnerships (0.8 percent) are less common.  The estimated average length of a banking relationship is 
almost 23 months.  This is defined as the number of months since the first loan in the data for the bank-
borrower pair as of January 1998.  Turning to loan characteristics, almost half of the sample consists of 
                                                 
10 According to the World Bank (2005), registering property in Bolivia takes on average 91 days – well above the 
same figure for the Latin American and the Caribbean regions overall (56 days) or for OECD countries (34 days).  
Similarly, the average cost of creating collateral (as a percentage of gross national income per capita) is 51 percent 
for Bolivia as opposed to 19 percent for Latin America and the Caribbean and five percent for OECD countries.   
 
11 Ley de Abreviación Procesal y Asistencia Familiar, Law No. 1760 of February 28, 1997. 
 
12 All other firm assets and obligations instead are subject to automatic stay once bankruptcy proceedings begin.  
Given the lengthy bankruptcy proceedings that characterize Bolivia and many other Civil Law countries, the 
recovery rates on such credits are often low (e.g., Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008)). 
 
13 For relationship length, loan amount, and maturity we report summary statistics for the level of these variables, 




installment loans.  The average loan amount is $148,902, the average loan maturity is almost 11 months, 
and the average loan interest rate is 13.5 percent, with an average spread of 9.5 percentage points over 
U.S. Treasury securities of comparable maturities. 
About 18 percent of our sample loans are secured by one of nine different types of assets.  In 
particular, nine percent of collateralized loans are secured by deposits in the same or another financial 
institution, almost four percent are secured by bank guarantees (such as letters of credit), and about two 
percent with securities (such as bonds and stocks).  Movable firm assets (such as accounts receivable, 
inventory, crops, tools, machines and equipment) are frequently pledged.  For our sample, almost 16 
percent of collateralized loans are secured by creditor-held movable collateral and almost 25 percent are 
secured by debtor-held movable collateral (i.e., pledges with and without transfer of possession).  Real 
estate is also a frequent form of collateral, as 20 percent of collateralized loans are secured by residential 
real estate and almost nine percent by commercial real estate.  Finally, almost 14 percent of collateralized 
loans are secured with endorsements from deposit warehouses backed by the deposit of commodities (i.e., 
collateral bonds), and two percent by vehicles.  With respect to ex post performance of the 25,918 loans 
that matured before the end of the sample period, 5.9 percent had ex post delinquencies or defaults.   
Next, we categorize these collateral types along three key economic dimensions: (1) liquidity, (2) 
divertability, and (3) ownership status.  Table 2 provides a mapping from collateral types to these 
economic characteristics.  An asset is considered liquid if it can be converted into cash quickly without 
substantial discount on its price.  Hence, we create an indicator variable, Liquid, that takes a value of one 
when the collateral is either: Pledged Deposits, Bank Guarantees, or Securities.  Asset divertibility is 
another important collateral characteristic.  Since nondivertible assets are less susceptible to borrower 
agency problems, they are better able to mitigate the ex ante and ex post frictions that arise because of 
informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders.  The variable Nondivertible takes a value of 
one for loans secured by the three liquid assets defined above as well as for loans secured by Creditor-
Held Movable Assets (i.e., movable firm assets that are in the control of the bank during the term of the 
loan) and Collateral Bonds.  Ownership status is also an important collateral characteristic.  Assets or 
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other forms of collateral pledged from outside the firm may act as additional equity in the firm as they are 
otherwise not attachable to the firm in the event of default.  The variable Outside takes a value of one for 
loans collateralized by either Bank Guarantees or Residential Real Estate pledged by limited liability 
firms (limited liability corporations and limited partnerships).  Residential real estate loans are assumed to 
be backed by real property owned by the firm’s principal shareholder and, in the case of limited liability 
firms, such assets would not otherwise be attachable in the event of bankruptcy.   
As shown in the last row of Table 2, 14.3 percent, 44.2 percent, and 14.7 percent of secured loans 
employ liquid, nondivertible, and outside collateral, respectively.  All else equal, liquidity, 
nondivertibility, and outside ownership status are considered desirable economic characteristics.  
Liquidity and nondivertibility are generally associated with greater certainty about the future value of 
collateral, while outside collateral pledges effectively act like additional firm equity and hence reduce 
moral hazard incentives.  As noted above, it is generally expected that all four of the risk-collateral 
channels should be stronger when the collateral characteristics are more desirable.  
 
III. Empirical Analysis 
We examine the relation between loan risk and collateral by conducting two sets of empirical 
tests delineated by the risk measure studied – loan risk premiums and ex post nonperformance.  Each set 
of tests explores the relation between the risk measure and the overall incidence of collateral, as well as 
the economic characteristics of the collateral pledges.  Regressions include several control variables, 
including: firm, relationship, and loan variables, as well as fixed effects for region, bank, industry, and 
time and sometimes interactions of firm, bank, and time fixed effects.   
Our loan risk premium regressions are estimated using OLS and can be summarized as: 
 
Risk_Premiumijkt = a(Collateralijkt, Firmjt, Relationshipjkt, Loanijkt, Bankk, Industryl, Regionm, Timet )         (1) 
Risk_Premiumijkt = b(Collateralijkt, Collateral Characteristicsijkt, Firmjt, Relationshipjkt, Loanijkt,Bankk,  




where i, j, k, l, m and t index loans, firms, banks, industries, regions, and time, respectively.   
In equations (1) – (2), Risk_Premiumijkt is defined as the loan interest rate minus the rate on U.S. 
Treasury securities of comparable maturity for the month of loan origination.14  The key explanatory 
variables are those reflecting collateral pledges.  Consistent with the extant literature, we first relate loan 
risk premiums to a simple indicator of whether the loan was collateralized or not – Collateralijkt (equation 
1).  We then repeat the experiment using Collateralijkt plus our three derived economic characteristics of 
collateral: Collateral Characteristicsijkt ≡ Liquid, Nondivertible, and Outside (equation 2).  We include the 
simple collateral indicator along with the economic characteristics because some types of collateral have 
none of these characteristics (i.e., they are illiquid, divertible, and inside).   
The vector Firmjt accounts for differences in firm characteristics, particularly legal structure and 
past loan performance problems.  We use a set of dummy variables indicating the legal structure of the 
firm: General Partnership, Limited Partnership, Joint Stock Company, and Limited Liability Corporation 
(Sole Proprietorship is the omitted group).  Prior_Default indicates whether the borrowing firm had 
defaulted on a loan with any lender in the previous 12 months.  Prior_NPL indicates whether the 
borrowing firm missed a payment on a loan with any lender in the previous 12 months.  Industry is a set 
of 18 dummy variables controlling for the firm’s industry classification (like the SIC or NAICS codes).15   
The vectors Relationshipjt and Loanjt account for differences in relationship length and other loan 
characteristics, respectively.  Relationship Length indicates the length of a bank-firm relationship and it is 
equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the number of months we observe the bank and borrower in a 
credit relationship.  Installment is a dummy variable equal to one if the contract is an installment loan 
                                                 
14 Available U.S. Treasury interest rates were interpolated to create interest rates for different maturities. 
 
15 The 19 industry categories are: Agriculture and cattle; Farming; Forestry and fishery; Extraction of oil and gas; 
Minerals; Manufacturing; Electricity, gas, and water; Construction; Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels and 
restaurants; Transport, storage, and communications; Financial Intermediation; Real estate activities; Public 
administration defense, and compulsory social security; Education; Communal and personal social services; 





rather than a discount loan.  In some specifications, we also include two additional loan characteristics: 
Amount and Maturity.  We exclude these variables from our main specifications because they are 
potentially endogenous as they may be determined simultaneously or even after the collateral decision. 
We also include Region, a set of dummy variables that indicate the location from which the loan 
was originated.  This includes nine regions in Bolivia as well as Argentina, Paraguay, Panama, and the 
United States.  Moreover, bank and time (month-year) fixed effects are included in the model, represented 
by Bankk and Timet, respectively.  Bank fixed effects should capture any systematic differences across 
banks in the pricing of their commercial loans.  The time fixed effects are intended to account for 
temporal differences in loan risk premiums related to business, interest rate, or credit cycles.   
Additional specifications include firm fixed effects interacted with bank and time fixed effects 
(i.e., Firmj*Bankk*Timet fixed effects).  Time-invariant firm and industry variables are omitted from these 
specifications.  The identification of parameters in this most conservative case is obtained from the 
subsample of firms with more than one loan from the same bank in the same month.  The addition of 
these interacted fixed effects help us to better identify the “risk shifting” and “loss mitigation” channels 
by virtually eliminating the “borrower selection” and “lender selection” channels as well as any other firm 
and bank heterogeneity that might be correlated with our collateral variables.  A firm’s collateral pledge 
may be correlated with firm characteristics or time-varying bank characteristics that are not captured by 
our firm-specific controls or the bank fixed effects, respectively, which may lead to biased estimates.  For 
example, smaller firms may be more constrained in their ability to pledge certain types of collateral.  The 
inclusion of Firmj*Bankk*Timet fixed effects essentially eliminates this problem. 
Our second set of empirical regressions use Ex_Post_Nonperformanceijt as a dependent variable.  
This variable indicates whether the loan eventually becomes delinquent or defaults, but does not measure 
the size of any losses.  As above, this measure is separately regressed on a dummy variable indicating that 
collateral was pledged, the set of collateral characteristics as well as the collateral dummy, plus all other 




Ex_Post_Nonperformanceijkt = c(Collateralijkt, Firmjt, Relationshipjkt, Loanijkt, Bankk, Industryl, Regionm, Timet)    (3) 
Ex_Post_Nonperformanceijkt = d(Collateralijkt, Collateral Characteristicsijkt, Firmjt, Relationshipjkt, Loanijkt,  
     Bankk, Industryl, Regionm, Timet)      (4) 
 
where i, j, k, l, m and t again index loans, firms, banks, industries, regions, and time, respectively.   
Importantly, in these specifications, only the “borrower selection,” “lender selection,” and “risk 
shifting” channels are present.  Consequently, these results – coupled with those for loan risk premiums – 
may allow us to better identify the singular importance of the “loss mitigation” channel of collateral.  For 
this analysis, we drop all loans that do not mature before the end of the sample (December 2003); thereby 
leaving 26,033 bank loans.  Since this has the effect of reducing the average loan maturity in our sample, 
we also eliminate all loans originated during the last six months of the sample (July – December 2003) – 
further reducing the sample to 25,391 loans.   
A limitation of this analysis relative to the loan risk premium analysis is that we cannot include 
firm fixed effects to control for unobserved borrower heterogeneity that may be correlated with collateral 




Table 3 presents the results for the loan risk premium regressions.  Columns I-II include only the 
collateral variables (collateral overall and collateral characteristics) along with the region, bank, and time 
fixed effects as well as a dummy variable indicating whether the loan is an installment loan (as opposed to 
a discount loan).  All four risk-collateral channels are in force for these regressions.  Subsequent 
specifications control for more and more of the two selection effects.  Columns III-IV offer results for 
regressions that further include measures of firm ownership structure and risk, the length of the bank-firm 
relationship, and industry fixed effects.  Columns V-VI incorporate Firmj*Bankk*Timet fixed effects, 
while removing all time-invariant firm characteristics as well as the individual bank and time fixed 
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effects.  Columns VII-VIII additionally control for two potentially endogenous loan contracts terms 
(Amount and Maturity).  The regressions in Columns V-VIII virtually eliminate the “lender selection” and 
“borrower selection” channels of collateral, as parameters are identified by effectively comparing loans to 
the same borrower by the same bank at approximately the same point in time.  
Table 4 provides the results for the ex post nonperformance regressions.  The table is structured 
like Table 3, except for the specifications with the Firmj*Bankk*Timet fixed effects.  As mentioned 
previously, we cannot estimate the ex post nonperformance regressions using these interactions because 
there are too few nonperformance observations that are repeated for individual borrowers.   
A. Collateral Overall.   
The estimated relation between loan risk premiums and the overall incidence of collateral is 
displayed in Columns I, III, V, and VII of Table 3.  In each of these regressions, we find a negative 
relation between the loan risk premiums and the overall incidence of collateral.  The results in Column I 
suggest that collateral overall is associated with a 60 basis point discount.  Given that “lender selection” is 
the only channel that implies a positive risk-collateral relation, the results are consistent with the net 
empirical domination of the combination of the “borrower selection,” “risk shifting,” and “loss 
mitigation” channels over the “lender selection” channel.  Moving from Column I to Column III, we 
control for several firm characteristics, which reduces the “lender selection” and “borrower selection” 
channels; and in Column V these channels are virtually eliminated because we are controlling for 
Firmj*Bankk*Timet fixed effects.  Looking across these columns, the negative overall relation between 
loan risk premiums and collateral is robust and quantitatively stable.  This implies that the measured 
negative relation in Column I is mainly driven by the “risk shifting” and/or “loss mitigation” channels; 
and not by the “borrower selection” channel.  Adding the potentially endogenous contract terms (Amount 
and Maturity) does not substantially alter the results (Column VII).  
Table 4 presents the marginal effects of a Probit model for ExPost_Nonperformanceijt.  In 
Column I, the overall risk-collateral relation is positive, suggesting the net empirical dominance of the 
“lender selection” channel over the “borrower selection” and “risk shifting” channels.  Recall that the 
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“loss mitigation” channel is not reflected in the ex post nonperformance variable.  These results remain 
unchanged as we move from Column I to Columns III and V, controlling for firm, relationship, and other 
loan characteristics.    
All in all, these results suggest that for collateral overall, the “lender selection” channel is an 
important motivation for collateral pledges, and that the “loss mitigation” channel is a main determinant 
of risk premiums.  We draw these conclusions as follows.  The findings in the risk premium regressions 
suggest that the “risk shifting” and/or “loss mitigation” channels dominate the “lender selection” and 
“borrower selection” channels.  This is because collateral is associated with lower risk premiums, ruling 
out the relative importance of the “lender selection” channel (which predicts a positive relation), and the 
association does not change significantly when strong controls including Firmj*Bankk*Timet fixed effects 
are specified, ruling out the relative importance of the “borrower selection” channel as well (which 
predicts a diminished magnitude of the relation when strong controls are added).  We also find that the 
“lender selection” channel dominates the “borrower selection” and “risk shifting” channels.  This is 
because collateral is associated with more ex post nonperformance, and only the “lender selection” 
channel predicts a positive relation.  The “borrower selection” and “risk shifting” channels predict 
negative associations and the “loss mitigation” channel is not reflected in the ex post nonperformance 
variable.  Thus, the “lender selection” channel is an important motivation for pledging collateral (more 
important than the “borrower selection” and “risk shifting” channels), and the “loss mitigation” channel is 
a main determinant of risk premiums (more important than the “lender selection” channel which predicts 
the opposite relation; the “borrower selection” channel which predicts the diminishment of the negative 
relation between collateral and risk premiums when strong controls are included; and the “risk shifting” 
channel which is dominated by the “lender selection” channel). 
B. Collateral Characteristics. 
The estimated relation between loan risk premiums and the economic characteristics of collateral 
are displayed in Columns II, IV, VI, and VIII of Table 3.  In each of these regressions, we find that the 
incidence of collateral in general is associated with lower loan risk premiums of roughly 40 basis points.  
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In Column II, we find that liquid and nondivertible collateral are each associated with further loan risk 
premium discounts, while firms that pledge outside collateral pay a higher loan risk premium (relative to 
both other secured loans and unsecured loans).  Each of the three economic characteristics of collateral is 
statistically significant in these regressions, consistent with our separate treatment.   
Moving from Column II to Columns IV and VI, we observe that Liquid collateral has a 
persistently negative and statistically significant coefficient in all three specifications.  This is consistent 
with substantial “risk shifting” and/or “loss mitigation” channels for liquid collateral.  These effects are 
identified by the fact that the relation is maintained in Column VI when the “borrower selection” channel 
is no longer in force.  The coefficient for Nondivertible is negative in Columns II and IV and statistically 
indistinguishable from zero in Column VI.  This finding may be viewed only as weak evidence of a 
“borrower selection” channel for this collateral characteristic since the statistical insignificance of the 
estimated coefficient in Column VI is driven by a marked increase in the standard error, rather than any 
material change in the point estimate.  The positive overall effect of Outside collateral in Columns II and 
IV is consistent with a strong “lender selection” channel, suggesting that the riskiest firms pledge outside 
collateral.  This is confirmed by the results in Columns VI, where the estimated coefficient on Outside is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero.  Again, adding the potentially endogenous contract terms 
(Amount and Maturity) does not alter the results (Column VIII). 
Next, we turn to the estimated relation between ex post nonperformance and our three economic 
characteristics of collateral in Columns II, IV, and VI of Table 4.  Here again, the statistical significance 
of the economic characteristics justifies their inclusion.  Individually, Liquid and Nondivertible collateral 
are each negatively and statistically significantly related to ex post nonperformance, although the joint 
significance of these variables with Collateral suggests a positive net effect relative to unsecured loans.  
The coefficient on Outside is marginally positively economically and statistically related to ex post 
nonperformance.  The positive coefficient on collateral as a whole and the joint positive effects of Liquid, 
Nondivertible, and Outside collateral (with collateral overall) suggest the presence of a strong “lender 
selection” channel for all kinds of collateral.   
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Overall, we find that the relative importance of the four loan risk-collateral channels varies with 
the economic characteristics of collateral.  Liquid collateral is associated with the largest reductions in 
loan risk premiums as well as an improvement in ex post nonperformance (relative to other collateralized 
loans), suggesting that the “loss mitigation” and/or “risk shifting” channels are relatively stronger for 
liquid collateral.  However, because the joint significance of the coefficients of Liquid and Collateral 
suggests a positive net effect on ex post nonperformance (relative to unsecured loans), the “lender 
selection” channel continues to dominate over the “borrower selection” and “risk shifting” channels.  
Nondivertible collateral is associated with reductions in loan risk premiums that are modestly larger than 
those found for collateral overall and appears to be associated with the “borrower selection” channel; 
although, this inference may be clouded by a lack of statistical power.  Outside collateral is associated 
with substantially larger loan risk premiums (relative to both collateral overall and unsecured loans), as 
well as significantly worse ex post performance.  This implies that only the riskiest borrowers pledge 
Outside collateral, consistent with a strong “lender selection” channel.   
Turning to the other explanatory variables, we see that each of the firm risk characteristics is 
generally positively related to loan risk premiums and ex post nonperformance.  One exception is 
Prior_Default which is statistically insignificant in the ex post nonperformance regressions perhaps 
owing to the small number of loans to firms that had recently defaulted and received new credit.  Relative 
to sole proprietorships, each of the other ownership structures are associated with lower loan risk 
premiums.  However, this finding is unlikely to be related to default risk as limited liability firms (limited 
liability companies and limited partnerships) tend to have more ex post nonperformance problems.  
Longer banking relationships appear to be associated with higher loan risk premiums and lower rates of 
ex post nonperformance (although the latter is not statistically significant), consistent with “lock-in 
effects” (e.g., Rajan, 1992).  Riskier firms are more likely to have installment loans as they are associated 
with higher loan risk premiums and higher rates of ex post nonperformance. 
C. Robustness Tests 
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Our main results in Tables 3 and 4 are robust to two additional checks.  Our most conservative 
specifications with the Firmj*Bankk*Timet fixed effects in Columns V-VIII of Table 3 are estimated for a 
subsample of borrowers with multiple loans from the same bank in the same month.  This raises the 
question of whether the results in Columns I-IV of Table 3 – as well as the results in Table 4 – are robust 
to using this smaller sample of loans.  When we conduct this experiment, we find that Collateral remains 
negatively related to loan risk premiums and this holds for Liquid and Nondivertible collateral, while 
Outside collateral is again associated with higher premiums.  Re-estimating the Ex_Post_Nonperformance 
regressions for the subsample yields similar results to Table 4 – the positive relation with Collateral 
overall and the joint positive relations with all three collateral characteristics are maintained.16  These 
results are not shown for brevity and are available upon request.    
Next, we re-estimate the specifications reported in Tables 3 and 4 after dropping all loans that 
appear to be continuations of previous loans.  (Loans designated in the registry as renegotiations have 
already been excluded from our analysis.)  Including continuations of previous loans could bias the 
estimated relations between ex post nonperformance and collateral.  This bias would arise in situations in 
which the borrower became distressed and the bank demanded that collateral is pledged, but recorded the 
adjustment as a new loan with overdue payments.  To identify such situations, we look for loans that are 
originated right after another loan at the same bank terminates and the two loans have the same contract 
amounts.  We identify 2,184 such loans, of which only 76 have collateral added.  Re-estimating equations 
(1) to (4) without these loans has virtually no effect on our results.  These results are also not shown for 
brevity and are available upon request. 
 
V. Additional Evidence 
                                                 
16 The coefficients on Liquid and Outside remain of the same signs as in the full sample, but become smaller in 




In order to supplement our previous findings, we explore two additional issues.  The first is the 
possible joint determination, or endogeneity, of loan risk premiums and collateral pledges.  The second 
concerns our mapping from the reported collateral types to collateral characteristics.   
A. Potential Endogeneity of Collateral in the Loan Risk Premium Regressions  
Under the ex ante theories of collateral, loan interest rates and collateral are jointly determined, 
which implies that collateral may be endogenous in the loan risk premiums regressions.17  To investigate 
whether the joint determination of loan risk premiums and collateral affects our findings, we employ an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach.  Specifically, we instrument for Collateral in equation (1) using 
information from prior loans that indicates whether the borrower has available collateral to pledge.  In 
particular, we create a dummy variable that equals one if collateral was pledged on any of the borrower’s 
outstanding loans between t-13 and t-1 that were successfully repaid prior to t.  This indicator is expected 
to be positively correlated with collateral pledges on a new loan, but is not jointly determined with the 
interest rate on the new loan.  Information on the types of collateral on prior loans is also used in a similar 
way to create instruments for the economic characteristics of collateral in equation (2).  For example, to 
instrument for Liquid collateral we create an indicator that equals one if liquid collateral was pledged on 
any of the borrower’s outstanding loans between t-13 and t-1 that were successfully repaid prior to t.  
Instruments for Nondivertible and Outside collateral were created in a similar way. 
Because Collateral is a categorical variable we use the two-step procedure described in 
Wooldridge (2002, pp. 623-625).18  This involves first estimating a Probit model of Collateral using our 
instrument and all other explanatory variables from equation (1) as independent variables.  The predicted 
values from this regression, 1̂P , are then used as an instrument in a standard IV model for equation (1) 
                                                 
17 Brick and Palia (2007) previously argued that loan risk premiums and collateral should be treated as jointly 
determined and provide supporting evidence for their sample of U.S. small business loans. 
 
18 A standard IV model would ignore the fact that the dependent variable in the first stage regression is a categorical 
variable and would estimate the empirical relations using OLS (i.e., a linear probability model). In this case, the 
estimated coefficients are both inconsistent and inefficient and the predicted values from this model do not 




using 2SLS.  In particular, Collateral is regressed on 1̂P  and all other explanatory variables in equation 
(1). The predicted values of this model, 2̂P , are then used to estimate the second stage regression, where 
the loan risk premium is regressed on 2̂P  and all other explanatory variables of equation (1).  The 
standard errors in the second stage regression are appropriately corrected.  
Table 5 presents the results for the IV estimation of loan risk premiums and compares them to the 
OLS estimates in Table 3 (Columns I-IV) for both the baseline specification as well as the expanded 
model that controls for firm ownership structure and risk, the length of the bank-firm relationship, and 
industry fixed effects.19  In all cases, the IV estimates for the relation between the incidence of collateral 
and loan risk premiums remains negative and statistically significant, although they suggest a stronger 
causal effect.  The results for the individual collateral characteristics are again qualitatively similar with 
the use of instrumental variables, although the effects are somewhat stronger.  These results suggest that 
the potential endogeneity of loan risk premiums and collateral pledges is not clouding our inferences.  
B. Collateral Types 
In our analysis above, we mapped reported collateral types into their underlying economic 
characteristics and then studied the empirical relation between these characteristics and loan risk.  To be 
transparent, we also present results using the individual collateral types.  Specifically, we replace the 
indicators for collateral in general and the three collateral characteristics in equations (2) and (4) with a 
vector of nine collateral types (described earlier): Collateral Typesijkt ≡ Pledged Deposits, Bank 
Guarantees, Securities, Creditor-Held Movable Assets, Debtor-Held Movable Assets, Residential Real 
Estate, Commercial Real Estate, Collateral Bonds, and Vehicles.  Because there is a specific collateral 
type for each secured loan, we exclude the overall collateral indicator from these regressions to avoid 
perfect collinearity.  The results are reported in Table 6.  The first four columns of the table report 
                                                 
19 In all cases, the instruments have positive and statistically significant coefficients in the first stage regressions.  




corresponding specifications for the loan risk premium regressions in Table 3, while the last three 
columns report the corresponding specifications for the ex post nonperformance regressions in Table 4.  
Our findings in Table 6 are in line with those reported earlier.  In particular, Column I shows that 
loans secured by virtually all types of collateral carry lower loan risk premiums than unsecured loans, 
consistent with the empirical domination of the “borrower selection”, “risk shifting,” and/or “loss 
mitigation” channels over the “lender selection” channel for virtually all collateral types.  The one 
exception is Residential Real Estate which is positively and statistically significantly related to loan risk 
premiums, consistent with the empirical domination of the “lender selection” channel for this type of 
collateral.  This is also consistent with our findings for Outside collateral in Table 3.  
Comparing the coefficients of the various types of collateral, we also observe that most liquid 
and/or nondivertible types of collateral, such as Pledged Deposits, Bank Guarantees, Securities, and 
Creditor-Held Movable Assets, have larger negative coefficients than less desirable types of collateral like 
Commercial Real Estate and Vehicles.  This is consistent with the negative and statistically significant 
coefficients for Liquid and Nondivertible collateral in Table 3.  Looking at the results in Column III, 
where the two selection channels are virtually eliminated, we observe that most of types of liquid and/or 
nondivertible collateral, such as Pledged Deposits, Bank Guarantees, Creditor-Held Movable Assets and 
Collateral Bonds maintain their negative and statistically significant coefficients, consistent with the 
empirical dominance of the “risk shifting” and/or “loss mitigation” channels for these collateral types. 
Turning to our ex post nonperformance results, we observe that the overall positive relation 
between collateral and ex post nonperformance documented in Table 4 is mainly driven by collateral 
types that are neither liquid nor nondivertible, such as Debtor-Held Movable Assets, Residential Real 
Estate, Commercial Real Estate, and Vehicles.  These types of collateral are positively related to ex post 
nonperformance, consistent with a dominant “lender selection” channel.  Some desirable collateral types 
that are both liquid and nondivertible, such as Pledged Deposits and Bank Guarantees, are actually 
negatively related to ex post nonperformance.  Since the “loss mitigation” channel is not present here, this 
finding, coupled with the results from the loan risk premium regressions in Column III suggests that a 
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“risk shifting” channel is especially important for these two types of collateral.  Finally, none of the other 
types of collateral are found to have a statistically significant relation to ex post nonperformance.   
Overall, our findings suggest that loans secured by most types of assets carry lower risk 
premiums than unsecured loans, with more desirable collateral (collateral types that were previously 
classified as liquid and/or nondivertible) carrying substantially larger discounts.  Our results also suggest 
that the overall positive relation between collateral and ex post nonperformance reported above is 
principally driven by collateral types that are neither liquid nor nondivertible.   
 
VI. Conclusions   
A puzzle in the empirical literature is that loan risk and collateral are sometimes found to be 
positively related and other times found to be negatively related.  This paper offers a potential solution to 
this puzzle by first highlighting four different risk-collateral channels implied by economic theory and 
then showing that the different channels are effective to different degrees depending upon the economic 
characteristics and types of collateral.  Thus, the mixed results in the literature may reflect the fact that 
different studies use data samples with different mixes of collateral characteristics and types.   
We find evidence supporting the economic importance of each of the four risk-collateral 
channels.  For our sample, collateral overall is associated with reduced loan risk premiums that do not 
vary when strong controls for the “borrower selection” and “lender selection” channels are included.  This 
suggests that the lower loan risk premiums are driven by the “risk shifting” and/or “loss mitigation” 
channels.  In addition, ex post nonperformance is positively related to collateral, suggesting that the 
“lender selection” channel dominates the “risk shifting” and “borrower selection” channels.  These results 
together imply that the “lender selection” channel is an important reason why collateral is pledged, and 
the “loss mitigation” channel is the main reason why loan risk premiums are lower for collateralized 
loans.  Furthermore, the risk-collateral channels appear to depend upon the economic characteristics of 
collateral.  The “lender selection” channel appears to be especially important for outside collateral, the 
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“risk-shifting” and “loss mitigation” channels are important for liquid collateral, while the “borrower 
selection” channel appears to hold weakly for nondivertible collateral.   
Collateral does not appear to be homogeneous in its economic effects and hence future research 
should include information about the economic characteristics and/or types of collateral whenever 
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Variables and Summary Statistics 
The table reports the notation and definitions of variables used in the analysis and summary statistics for all loans in the 
sample.  The summary statistics for Ex Post Nonperformance use the number of loans that matured before the end of the 
sample period. 
Variables Description Obs Mean St. Dev.
Past Nonperformance
Prior_Default Equals one if the borrower had defaulted on a loan anytime in the previous 28,252     0.003 0.052
12 months with any lender, and is zero otherwise
Prior_NPL Equals one if the borrower had overdue payments of at least 30 days with 28,252     0.211 0.408
any bank anytime in the previous 12 months, and is zero otherwise
Sole Proprietorship Equals one if the firm is a sole proprietorship, and is zero otherwise 28,252     0.126 0.332
General Partnership Equals one if the firm is a general partnership (i.e., all partners have unlimited 28,252     0.008 0.091
liability and ownership is not transferable), and is zero otherwise
Limited Partnership Equals one if the firms is a limited partnership (i.e., some partners have limited 28,252     0.136 0.343
 liability and their ownership rights are transferable), and is zero otherwise
Joint Stock Company Equals one if the firm is a joint stock company (i.e., all partners have unlimited 28,252     0.222 0.415
liability and their ownership rights are transferable), and is zero otherwise
Limited Liability Company Equals one if the firm is a limited liability company (i.e., all partners have limited 28,252     0.488 0.500
liability and transferable ownership rights), and is zero otherwise
Rel_Length Length of bank-firm relationship in months 28,252     22.704 15.769
Installment Equals one if an installment loan and zero if a discount loan 28,252     0.456 0.498
Amount Loan amount at loan origination in US dollars 28,252     148,902 436,026
Maturity Number of months between loan origination and maturity 28,252     10.757 12.833
Interest Rate Annual contractual interest rate at loan origination 28,252     13.538 2.848
Risk Premium Loan interest rate minus U.S. Treasury rate of comparable maturity at origination 28,252     9.507 2.557
Collateral Equals one if collateral was pledged at loan origination, and is zero otherwise 28,252     0.177 0.381
   Types of Collateral
   Pledged Deposits Equals one if deposits were pledged, and is zero otherwise 4,989       0.091 0.287
   Bank Guarantees Equals one if bank guarantees or letters of credit were pledged, and is 4,989       0.037 0.188
 zero otherwise
   Securities Equals one if bonds or stocks were pledged, and is zero otherwise 4,989       0.022 0.146
   Creditor-Held Movable Assets Equals one if there is a possessory security on the firm's movable assets (e.g., 4,989       0.158 0.364
inventory, crops, properties, tools, and equipment), and is zero otherwise
   Debtor-Held Movable Assets Equals one if there is a non-possessory security on the firm's movable assets 4,989       0.248 0.432
(e.g., a/cs receivable, inventory, crops, properties, tools, and equipment), 
and is zero otherwise
   Residential Real Estate Equals one if a residential real estate is pledged, and is zero otherwise 4,989       0.199 0.399
   Commercial Real Estate Equals one if a commercial real estate is pledged, and is zero otherwise 4,989       0.088 0.283
   Collateral Bonds Equals one if a loan is secured with endorsements from deposit warehouses 4,989       0.135 0.342
backed by the deposit of commodities ("Bonos de Prenda").
   Vehicles Equals one if vehicles were pledged, and is zero otherwise 4,989       0.023 0.149
Ex Post Loan Performance
Ex_Post_Nonperformance Equals one if a loan is 30+ days overdue anytime after origination or if it is 25,918     0.059 0.237









Mapping from Collateral Types to Economic Characteristics 
Types of Collateral
Liquid Nondivertible Outside
Pledged Deposits 1 1 0
Bank Guarantees 1 1 1
Securities 1 1 0
Creditor-Held Movable Assets 0 1 0
Debtor-Held Movable Assets 0 0 0
Residential Real Estate_Limited Liability Companies 0 0 1
Residential Real Estate_Non Limited Liability Companies 0 0 0
Commercial Real Estate 0 0 0
Collateral Bonds 0 1 0
Vehicles 0 0 0







Determinants of Loan Risk Premiums 
This table reports OLS regressions for Risk_Premiumijt, which is defined as the loan interest rate at loan origination minus the rate of U.S. 
Treasury bill with comparable maturities.  Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White standard errors and reported 
between brackets.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Collateral
Collateral -0.600*** -0.413*** -0.580*** -0.431*** -0.636*** -0.466*** -0.525*** -0.317*
[0.044] [0.059] [0.043] [0.056] [0.096] [0.171] [0.097] [0.172]
Collateral Characteristics
Liquid -1.197*** -1.199*** -0.517** -0.643**
[0.127] [0.130] [0.255] [0.266]
Nondivertible -0.242*** -0.165** -0.16 -0.189
[0.084] [0.081] [0.188] [0.186]
Outside 1.073*** 1.075*** -0.086 -0.102







General Partnership -0.403*** -0.441***
[0.137] [0.137]
Limited Partnership -0.345*** -0.349***
[0.048] [0.048]
Joint Stock Company -1.269*** -1.270***
[0.044] [0.043]






Installment 0.077*** 0.04 0.047* 0.016 0.066 0.051 0.575*** 0.566***





Constant 11.117*** 11.174*** 10.793*** 10.836*** 9.247*** 9.250*** 9.837*** 9.853***
[0.099] [0.098] [0.127] [0.126] [0.025] [0.025] [0.205] [0.203]
Fixed Effects
Industry Included Included
Region Included Included Included Included
Bank Included Included Included Included
Time (Month-Year) Included Included Included Included
Firm*Bank*Time Included Included Included Included
(Adjusted) R-squared 0.35 0.36 0.41 0.42 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Observations 28,252     28,252      28,252        28,252        13,274      13,274        13,274         13,274          








Determinants of Ex Post Nonperformance 
This table reports the marginal effects of Probit regressions for Ex Post Nonperformance, a dummy variable that equals one if a loan is 
30+ days overdue anytime after its origination or if it is downgraded to the default status (i.e., given a rating of 5).  For continuous 
variables we report the effect for an infinitesimal change in each independent variable and for dummy variables we report the estimated 
effect of a change from 0 to 1.  P0 is the predicted probability of ex post nonperformance, evaluated at the mean of all independent 
variables.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  The standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity using White standard errors. 
I II III IV V VI
Collateral
Collateral 0.035*** 0.056*** 0.028*** 0.049*** 0.028*** 0.049***
[0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007]
Collateral Characteristics
Liquid -0.033*** -0.024*** -0.023***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
Nondivertible -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.025***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
Outside 0.020* 0.019* 0.017
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010]
Past Nonperformance
Prior_Default 0.02 0.02 0.017 0.018
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.024]
Prior_NPL 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.062***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Firm Characteristics
General Partnership -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.014
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Limited Partnership 0.016*** 0.014** 0.017*** 0.015***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Joint Stock Company -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Limited Liability Company 0.008** 0.007* 0.009** 0.008*
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Relation Characteristic
Rel_Length -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Loan Characteristics
Installment 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.016***






Industry Included Included Included Included
Region Included Included Included Included Included Included
Bank Included Included Included Included Included Included
Time (Month-Year) Included Included Included Included Included Included
Pseudo R-Squared 0.094 0.1 0.154 0.159 0.134 0.139
P0 0.045 0.044 0.038 0.037 0.039 0.038
Observations 25,391         25,391        25,380          25,380         25,380             25,380              








Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Determinants of Loan Risk Premiums 
This table compares instrumental variables (IV) and OLS estimates for Risk_Premiumijt, which is defined as the loan interest rate at loan 
origination minus the rate of U.S. Treasury bill with comparable maturities.  IV estimates are calculated using the Wooldridge (2002) 
procedure.  Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White standard errors and reported between brackets.  ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Collateral
Collateral -0.600*** -0.413*** -1.551*** -1.656*** -0.580*** -0.431*** -1.376*** -1.286***
[0.044] [0.059] [0.184] [0.334] [0.043] [0.056] [0.163] [0.307]
Collateral Characteristics
Liquid -1.197*** -1.331*** -1.199*** -0.593**
[0.127] [0.326] [0.130] [0.299]
Nondivertible -0.242*** -0.299 -0.165** -0.760**
[0.084] [0.356] [0.081] [0.329]
Outside 1.073*** 1.116*** 1.075*** 1.473***
[0.111] [0.284] [0.109] [0.213]
Past Nonperformance
Prior_Default 0.739*** 0.700*** 0.892***
[0.242] [0.242] [0.250]
Prior_NPL 0.468*** 0.466*** 0.495*** 0.502***
[0.029] [0.029] [0.031] [0.032]
Firm Characteristics
General Partnership -0.403*** -0.441*** -0.455***
[0.137] [0.137] [0.138]
Limited Partnership -0.345*** -0.349*** -0.400*** -0.413***
[0.048] [0.048] [0.049] [0.050]
Joint Stock Company -1.269*** -1.270*** -1.254*** -1.249***
[0.044] [0.043] [0.044] [0.045]
Limited Liability Company -0.397*** -0.439*** -0.438*** -0.492***
[0.036] [0.036] [0.037] [0.038]
Relation Characteristic
Rel_Length 0.037** 0.045*** 0.003 0.011
[0.016] [0.016] [0.018] [0.019]
Loan Characteristics
Installment 0.077*** 0.04 0.115*** 0.079** 0.047* 0.016 0.077*** 0.021
[0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.034] [0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.031]
Constant 11.117*** 11.174*** 11.140*** 11.193*** 10.793*** 10.836*** 10.901*** 10.976***
[0.099] [0.098] [0.101] [0.103] [0.127] [0.126] [0.130] [0.131]
Fixed Effects
Industry Included Included Included Included
Region Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Bank Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Time (Month-Year) Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 28,252       28,252       28,252       27785 28,252       28,252       28,245       27,402       
Baseline (+) Firm Characteristics






Empirical Relation between Loan Risk and Collateral Types 
This table reports results exploring the empirical relation between loan risk (loan risk premium and ex post nonperformance) and 
collateral types.  OLS regressions are estimated for Risk_Premiumijt, which is defined as the loan interest rate at loan origination minus 
the rate of U.S. Treasury bill with comparable maturities. Marginal effects from Probit regressions are presented for Ex Post 
Nonperformance, a dummy variable that equals one if a loan is 30+ days overdue anytime after its origination or if it is downgraded to 
the default status (i.e., given a rating of 5).  In both cases, standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White standard errors 
and reported between brackets.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
I II III IV V VI VII
Collateral Types
Pledged Deposits -1.692*** -1.773*** -1.168*** -1.160*** -0.023*** -0.017** -0.018**
[0.123] [0.126] [0.272] [0.289] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Bank Guarantees -1.185*** -0.763*** -1.142*** -1.196*** -0.023** -0.020** -0.018*
[0.221] [0.221] [0.322] [0.342] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011]
Securities -0.718*** -0.820*** -0.403 -0.217 0.016 0.009 0.012
[0.183] [0.184] [0.486] [0.415] [0.025] [0.022] [0.023]
Creditor-Held Movable Assets -0.965*** -0.822*** -0.823*** -0.658*** 0.015 0.003 0.001
[0.097] [0.096] [0.140] [0.139] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007]
Debtor-Held Movable Assets -0.820*** -0.657*** -0.597 -0.556 0.080*** 0.062*** 0.066***
[0.089] [0.081] [0.355] [0.359] [0.012] [0.010] [0.011]
Residential Real Estate 0.742*** 0.558*** -0.156 0.093 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.047***
[0.086] [0.084] [0.161] [0.161] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012]
Commercial Real Estate -0.368*** -0.496*** -0.406 -0.008 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.075***
[0.120] [0.119] [0.302] [0.290] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019]
Collateral Bonds -0.343*** -0.332*** -0.382*** -0.318*** 0.016 0.005 0.008
[0.082] [0.083] [0.121] [0.113] [0.010] [0.008] [0.008]
Vehicles -0.157 -0.311* -0.353 0.049 0.058* 0.071** 0.060*
[0.157] [0.165] [0.312] [0.239] [0.033] [0.036] [0.034]
Past Nonperformance
Prior_Default 0.582** 0.02 0.018
[0.236] [0.025] [0.025]
Prior_NPL 0.471*** 0.061*** 0.062***
[0.029] [0.004] [0.004]
Firm Characteristics
General Partnership -0.431*** -0.012 -0.014
[0.137] [0.010] [0.010]
Limited Partnership -0.319*** 0.013** 0.014**
[0.048] [0.006] [0.006]
Joint Stock Company -1.213*** -0.005 -0.002
[0.043] [0.004] [0.005]
Limited Liability Company -0.366*** 0.008** 0.008**
[0.036] [0.004] [0.004]
Relation Characteristic
Rel_Length 0.045*** -0.001 -0.001
[0.016] [0.002] [0.002]
Loan Characteristics
Installment 0.024 0.007 0.046 0.565*** 0.020*** 0.016***





Constant 11.063*** 10.711*** 9.248*** 9.864***
[0.095] [0.124] [0.025] [0.203]
Fixed Effects
Industry Included Included Included
Region Included Included Included Included Included
Bank Included Included Included Included Included
Time (Month-Year) Included Included Included Included Included
Firm*Bank*Time Included Included
(Adjusted) R-squared 0.36 0.42 0.87 0.87
Pseudo R-Square 0.1 0.159 0.139
P0 0.044 0.037 0.038
Observations 28,252       28,252       13,274       13,274       25,391       25,380       25,380       
Ex Post Nonperformance
(OLS) (Probit Model - Marginal Effects)
Risk Premium
 
